Afsan Chowdhury, Journalist, researcher, and political commentator/Dhaka Tribune
What Bangladesh’s politicians can learn from regional history
December is a significant month not just for Bangladesh, but Pakistan as well. If for Bangladesh it signals victory over Pakistani forces, the Pakistanis have to face the harsh judgment of history that it not only was humiliated, but could remain as Pakistan for only 24+ years.
It was the most damning of all indictments not only of the state of Pakistan, but the entire political imagination and activism that led to its birth in 1947. That it had become a state which was ready to commit genocide on its own people — as they claimed — and continued to believe it was its holy political duty to do so makes the case even worse. It was not a ragtag band of rogue killers but its own army that did in effect killed Pakistan.
Having died on December 16, 1971, it would be more appropriate if they celebrated Pakistan day on the same date as well because the Pakistan of Jinnah died, and this current Pakistan is more a product of its main state force, the army, and its auxiliary battalion, the civil politicians, were born.
Pakistan, a history of political failure
Apart from the historical questions about whether Pakistan was meant at all to be a centrist state or not, the evidence shows a high level of dysfunctional management given the odd structure it was born with. It’s a bit amazing in terms of statecraft that a systemic denial of its majority population was considered acceptable by its exclusive ruling cluster. Had Pakistan been able to stay healthy and intact, this policy could be justified, but it didn’t serve Pakistan well. The December ignominy is the best answer to what the Pakistan policy of segregationist led to.
But the matter goes deeper than that, because Pakistan’s state model, which was dependent on the military, never foresaw that socio-economic denial eats away at some abstract loyalty called “the state.” One reason why it couldn’t read the state well was because the politicians never had the capacity to read people’s opinions. The problem was, the Pakistan army never was meant to be the defender of both its clusters. Pakistan lay in West Pakistan. And this was not entirely a military decision but a political one as well.
The flawed imagination of Pakistan
The imagination of Pakistan as it came into being in 1947 and its internal power construction and mechanism made Pakistan the way it was. So though civil politicians soon after Jinnah were not always in charge, the ball that made Pakistan’s military takeover was rolled by the several civilian founders of Pakistan.
If the military peak oppression was the genocide of 1971, the civil equivalent was to declare Urdu as the only state language issue. This was pushed directly by Jinnah and his closest allies. So, the errors that led to the death of original Pakistan was not a result of military but civilian thinking, including of its founder.
They imagined a Pakistan in which military rule was inevitable. And going by its history from 1971 to 2018, the problems that plague it are still high with no supremacy of civil and pluralism ensured.
The Indian scenario
The player which made a difference in 1971 was India, who took advantage of every mistake Pakistan committed both historically and in its immediate past. Pakistan never had the preparations or infrastructure to fight an Indian invasion supported by Bangladeshis ever in 1971. To keep it that way undefended was a part of Pakistan’s political policy. The military followed the policy which was established as early as 1947.
But like it or not, India — not a homogeneous state — has failed in many sectors but not politically compared to Pakistan. The judiciary in India doesn’t have to be courageous to deliver, but the system is more robust than elsewhere in South Asia.
Its electoral system is also robust, and the recent rout of BJP shows that as well. BJP is not liking what has happened, but not complaining that the election was rigged. It means that the electoral system works, while in Pakistan, the military rules, and when convenient, allows civilians to do so though de facto power lies with the military.
Bangladesh has a weak political structure
The third player is Bangladesh, as it faces elections on December 30, 2018. It doesn’t have a good record. It’s not done as bad as Pakistan, but its trajectory is not like that of India.
Since 1971, it has had almost all kinds of government, civil, military, and in-between, but no stability relating to what should be the established form of transfer of political power.While the AL wants the current form, BNP wants the caretaker system, showing that the two major parties can’t even agree on the nature of the election process. It’s a far cry from the electoral systemic stability that has been achieved in India.
Bangladesh has achieved much in the field of growth and several human development indicators, but where it lacks is in the political space. Underdeveloped politics produces underdeveloped governance, and Bangladesh’s politicians should learn from the regional history as to how badly it has served Pakistan, and how advantageous it has been for India.