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Condition of Power Politics in the Indian Ocean Region: An analysis
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Dr. Forqan Uddin Ahmed, Former DDG of Bangladesh Ansar & VDP. Writer, columnist and researcher.
China’s ability to influence events in the Indian Ocean region is however, still limited, although she would like to reassert herself after the collapse of the Soviet Union. China would continue to take active interests in the Indian Ocean region for geographical, political and ideological reasons, although her posture has undergone certain changes recently. Generally, the Chinese have been maintaining the influence in the region in the form of naval power projection and by providing military and economic aid to a good number of countries. China could derive two board advantages by influencing events in the Indian Ocean region. First, due to its geographical proximity with Indian Ocean states, China has a demonstrable interest in the events taking place adjacent to its borders. Secondly, since most of the states of the region fall in the category of less developed countries she claims to have congruity for interest with them. Such linkages serve to define Chinese interests.
With the end of the Cold War, and the reduction of the US forces in the region that traditional regional rivalries between China and Japan, China and Vietnam, China and India, China and Russia are likely to resurface. Conflicting territorial claims between China and Japan, China and Vietnam and China and India could participate a more assertive China. China has resented the new world order of former President Bush. She would like to see a multiplier world than the unipolar world with declining US global power and China’s ability to resist external interference in different regions.
India’s military action in Ladakh and Sikkim and became watchful on India’s activities in Nepal, Bhutan and North East Frontier Agency. China thus got involved in South Asian power struggle by ensuring the security of Tibet. Nehru had formally accepted China as a South Asian power by signing an agreement with China in 1954. It mainly recognized the Tibet region of China. But in anyway China doesn’t recognize the borders inherited inherited from the British; She claims more or less all territories of India state of Arunachal Pradesh and significant territory in Ladakh. China also claims some of the passcs in Himachal Pradesh and the central sector of India. The Chinese do not recognize Sikkim as part of India, nor the special relationship of Bhutan with India. China offered a package deal which would allow Arunachal Pradesh to India, keeping the vital strategic link with her. It was rejected by India. India seeks recognition of its control over Kashmir and Sikkim, which China does not oblige. One can, therefore, conclude that the border issues between China and India are rather complex. In such scenario and Indian viewpoint gives us the clue in understanding the threat environment more precisely. In spite of improvement in diplomatic relations, Chinese forces continue to threaten India security both in conventional and nuclear fields. We can, however, see the imperatives and compulsions of both India and China in the rapprochement process, which is on the moment. Historically, strategically and economically, both China and India have enough interests in South-east Asia. The region is located close to both India and China and the area is considered the meeting place of Indian and Chinese cultural influences. Both Indian and Chinese cultural practices are prominent as there are a good number of inhabitants of Chinese and India origin in the region. Almost all the countries specially the littoral states of the Indian Ocean have been fighting the insurgencies and they have been encountering tremendous difficulties in achieving national Integration. Such a state of affairs usually invites the extra-regional powers. Both India and China have been directly or indirectly involved positively or negatively in the process of political development of the states of the region. Let us specially examine why South-east Asia is important to India. Both India and the countries of South-east Asia fought against the colonial rule of the British Raj. There is, therefore, a congruence of nationalistic movements in both the areas. Indian political elites especially Jawaharlal Nehru thought that future of India was indivisible from future of Asia and especially from Southeast Asia. Secondly, Southeast Asia deserves special strategic importance since India’s nationalist elite was concerned about India’s eastern flank and sea-word approaches specially through the straits of Malacca. India, therefore, lays a lot of importance to the Indian Ocean for the defence of Indian peninsula. Island territories of India in the Bay of Bengal lie only 90 miles from the Straits of Malacca. After the retreat of Soviet-American power, ASEAN countries are now concerned about the dominance of the local regional powers like India, China and Japan. This can be substantiated by the fact that India’s perspective force structure planning in the year 2000-2010 would be 3 aircraft carriers(1993-2), Nuclear submarines 62 (1993-I), Attack Submarines 16 (1993-10), destroyers 24-32 (1993-4), and sea Harrier aircrafts 40 (1993-10). India has already developed the strategically important port Blair situated close to the Malacca strait. We can also see the viewpoints of one Indian strategist, “Southeast Asia sits strategically between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, controlling major trade routes and sea lanes used by merchant ships and navies. Peace and stability in the area and good will of its nations are vital to Indian security. From the South-East Asian point of view, India is important as their region is placed between India and China, the two giants of Asia. It is, therefore, natural that the roles of India and Southeast Asia will have a major impact on each others’ foreign and economic politics”. With the end of bipolarity, multipolarity has become more evident especially in Asia. The increasing economic, political and military weights of China, Japan and India have come into focus. India has gained pre-eminent position in South Asia and has considerable influence in India Ocean region. Again militarily, New Delhi has to be concerned about the Chinese SLBM force and the possibility that China might soon cruise the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, India attempts to acquire the deterrent capabilities vis-a-vis China raises suspicions with Indonesia.This logic presupposes the Indian’s attempt to dominate the Southeast Asian archipelago. In 1965 war, India faced two fronts i.e., Pakistan and China. At the same time Indonesia aligned itself with China and Pakistan and opened a third front. It also renamed Indian Ocean as Indonesian Ocean. Indonesia laid claims on Nicobar Islands, and stepped up hostile activities around Andamans and Nicobars.
The moment China comes out of these difficulties, it is likely to become assertive and start putting its weights on Southeast Asian affairs. It is already in the way to have a credible blue water navy. China should not be seen as an external actor in Southeast Asian affairs. It is historically, demographically and strategically almost intimately involved with the affairs of South East Asia as already shown. Power equation therefore, gets affected between India and China since both the powers are involved in area. Both India and China have to counter each other both in South and Southeast Asia. This power equation gets further affected with the inputs coming from another flank i.e., Central Asian Republics.
Despite China’s public embrace of India and the official elevation of Sino-Indian relations to an unprecedented level, Beijing’s distrust and hostility toward India run deep, and vice versa. While the two countries have incompatible interests on a range of key issues, there is little chance of reconciling those differences any time soon. In the meantime, China is trying to both stabilize ties with India and prepare for future disruptions. China and India are both powers with regional hegemonic ambition and potential. Their structural conflict is irreconcilable until the two countries find a mutually agreeable compromise in their regional arrangements. Efforts to address the endogenous frictions — such as the border dispute and trade imbalance — could foreseeably help to facilitate that compromise. However, in the era of great-power rivalry and domestic populism, such efforts would be exceedingly difficult. India faces critical strategic choices. In ordinary circumstances, the country’s rapid economic growth might afford it greater control over its external environment, but India’s rise is taking place in the shadow of China’s even more dramatic growth. China’s rise, even aside from the aggressive behavior it has exhibited in places like the South China Sea, would be a challenge for India because it opens up the possibility of China dominating its neighbors, including India. China’s wealth and the influence that it brings to bear on international politics is just as great a challenge, especially when India’s interests clash with those of China. Beijing’s growing assertiveness demonstrates in stark relief the consequences of an unbalanced Asia. This is the central strategic problem that India faces: how to secure itself and promote its national interests in a grossly unbalanced strategic environment.
One can imagine a range of effective diplomatic engagements going forward, including a broad effort through the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum to establish norms for accurate medical and economic statistics. Analysis in the region, a strategic medical equipment reserve comparable to the strategic petroleum reserve established after the 1973 oil shocks, or a regional center for disease control centered in Singapore. One could also imagine a more effective effort to knit together bilateral alliances in the region in response to the crisis—instead of allowing the continuation of the current beggar-thy-neighbor spats between Tokyo and Seoul over travel bans and medical equipment. The United States has traditionally worked with allies in the wake of crises to reduce barriers to the flow of trade, information, and technology. In Schumpeterian, fashion successive U.S. administrations have usually been able to reinforce trans-Pacific architecture out of the disruption caused by financial, natural, or pandemic crises in the region. Though not evident in the current White House response—perhaps understandably so given the sudden impact of the pandemic—this instinct is nevertheless well ingrained in Congress and the foreign policy community and may yet come forth.
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